Russia’s expanding military and economic footprint in the Sahel has failed to deliver the promised security, as jihadist violence continues to escalate across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.
Since 2021, Moscow has deepened its influence in the region, capitalising on strained relations between local military juntas and their former Western partners.
Central to this strategy has been the deployment of the Wagner paramilitary group, followed by the Africa Corps, alongside strategic agreements such as the July 2025 deal between Rosatom and Niger covering nuclear energy, medicine, and vocational training.
Despite these moves, the tide of violence has shown little sign of turning. Hopes that Wagner’s arrival would quickly reverse the jihadist advance have been dashed.
In Mali, although the army reclaimed a rebel stronghold in 2023 with Wagner’s support, attacks by al-Qaeda-linked groups, including JNIM, have intensified.
A major assault in Bamako in 2024 left more than 70 people dead, underscoring the enduring strength of armed groups despite Russian backing.
In Burkina Faso, the crisis has deepened to near-civil war levels. Since 2015, more than 20,000 people have been killed and two million displaced, even as foreign forces have increased their presence.
The conflict’s scale now rivals that of Nigeria, a country with more than four times Burkina Faso’s population.
Niger has not been spared either. Russian instructors are currently training its armed forces, yet deadly attacks persist. In March 2025, an assault in the country’s west attributed to Islamic State-Sahel left dozens dead, exposing the fragility of state control.
Russia’s interventions, initially framed as a stabilising force, have so far struggled to provide meaningful change. The Sahel remains mired in violence, with mounting casualties and no clear path to lasting security despite the heavy presence of foreign forces.
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