A newly adopted set of internal regulations in Senegal’s National Assembly has ignited a nationwide debate over the boundaries of parliamentary authority and judicial independence.
Central to the controversy is Article 56, a provision that, for the first time, allows Members of Parliament to summon sitting magistrates under specific conditions—an unprecedented move that some hail as a democratic leap, while others view it as a threat to the separation of powers.
The revised parliamentary rules, adopted through rare cross-party consensus, significantly expand the legislature’s oversight tools. Previously governed by a single article, the framework for parliamentary commissions of inquiry now spans six distinct provisions.
These include the power to summon witnesses, waive professional confidentiality, and initiate legal proceedings if wrongdoing is discovered.
At the heart of this institutional transformation is Article 56, which permits MPs to hear serving judges—provided the Minister of Justice approves, the case in question is not under active judicial consideration, and no coercive measures are used to compel a magistrate’s appearance.
However, the measure has not gone unchallenged. Magistrate Mamadou Yakham Keita, a judge in Senegal’s financial and judicial chamber, warned of the dangers posed by Article 56.
“Entrusting a political figure with the sole authority to regulate the judiciary’s relationship with Parliament indirectly politicizes judicial protection,” he argued, citing the instability of ministerial appointments.
Drawing from France’s controversial questioning of Judge Burgaud, Keita described the potential hearing of sitting judges before lawmakers as an institutional fault line that could erode public confidence in the judiciary.
In response, MP Amadou Ba, a key architect of the new rules, defended the reform, asserting that it is designed to reinforce accountability without infringing on judicial independence.
“Article 56 is not an overreach; it’s a safeguard. It creates a structured space for oversight, not interference,” Ba said. He emphasized that hearings would focus on systemic issues—like pretrial detention practices and court congestion—not individual cases.
He also cited international examples where magistrates engage with legislative bodies without compromising their impartiality.
The emergence of Article 56 has sparked a broader reflection on the future of democratic governance in Senegal.
While views diverge sharply, the conversation underscores a growing national appetite for transparency and institutional accountability.
As the country navigates this legal and constitutional frontier, citizens are watching closely—eager to see whether Senegal can uphold its tradition of democratic resilience while embracing the complexities of modern oversight.
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